19 February 2026
Chicago 12, Melborne City, USA

Iran Update, February 18, 2026

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An unspecified adviser to US President Donald Trump told Axios on February 18 that Trump is frustrated with the insufficient progress made towards an agreement with Iran.[1] CTP-ISW continues to assess that both sides’ negotiating red lines make reaching an agreement unlikely unless the position of either side changes. The Iranian regime has not indicated that it is willing to commit to US demands of zero enrichment, limiting its ballistic missile program, or ceasing support for its proxies and partners in the region.[2] The Trump adviser told Axios that there is a “90 percent” chance of US military action “in the next few weeks.”[3] Other unspecified sources described a joint US-Israeli campaign that would be “massive,” “weeks-long,” and “existential” for the regime.[4] Two Israeli officials told Axios that Israel is preparing for a military conflict to possibly take place “within days.”[5] The United States has moved a large number of assets into the region, including the upcoming arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group.[6]

Some Iranians continued to hold anti-regime protests on February 18 despite the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on the recent wave of protests, which emphasizes the deep public frustration and disillusionment with the regime for its refusal to address the people’s grievances. CTP-ISW recorded six anti-regime protests across five provinces on February 18 at memorials that marked the end of the 40-day mourning period for protesters killed by security forces on January 8 and 9.[7] A BBC journalist reported that security forces fired tear gas targeting protesters and detained several protesters at Behest-e Zahra cemetery, Tehran City, on February 18.[8] Another Iranian journalist circulated photos of several Basij personnel in Sattarkhan Neighborhood, central Tehran City, on February 18.[9] An Esfahan City resident told Reuters on February 18 that ”people are [still] angry” and ”frustrated” at the regime and asked ”how long can [the regime] kill people to stay in power?”[10] The Iranian Teachers Union held a nationwide strike on February 18 to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period as well, which resulted in the closures of many schools across Iran.[11] Security forces killed at least 7,000 individuals and detained well over 50,000 protesters during the recent protests, according to a US-based Iran human rights organization on February 15.[12]

The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over State of Law Coalition leader and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s nomination for the premiership. Iraqi media reported on February 18 that the Shia Coordination Framework is divided into three “camps:” parties that support Maliki’s nomination, parties that oppose him, and several neutral parties.[13] Iraqi media characterized the Shia Coordination Framework into the following groups:

  • In favor of Maliki’s nomination: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Iraqi Foundation Alliance head Mohsen al Mandalawi support Maliki’s nomination.[14]
  • Opposed to Maliki’s nomination: Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali, National State Forces Alliance leader Ammar al Hakim, Reconstruction and Development Coalition member Ahmed al Asadi, Victory Coalition leader Haider al Abadi, and Imam Ali Brigades head Shibl al Zaidi are opposed to Maliki’s nomination.[15] Khazali and Hakim have led intra-framework opposition to Maliki’s nomination since the framework nominated Maliki in mid-January 2026.[16]
  • Neutral to Maliki’s nomination: Absher Ya Iraq head Humam Hamoudi, Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada leader Abu Alaa al Walai, Tasmeem Alliance member Amer al Fayez, and the Virtue Party.[17] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s political wing and the Virtue Party are allied with Maliki’s State of Law Coalition.[18]

Some Shia Coordination Framework parties likely want Maliki to withdraw from the premiership race voluntarily to avoid publicly succumbing to the United States’ staunch opposition to Maliki while also avoiding US sanctions. The United States has repeatedly expressed its opposition to Maliki. US President Donald Trump warned on January 27 that the United States will “no longer help Iraq” if Maliki becomes prime minister, for example.[19] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on February 18 that some framework members want Maliki to voluntarily withdraw from the premiership race because the framework “fears” replacing Maliki directly.[20]

These framework parties may be concerned about the political repercussions of publicly capitulating to US pressure against Maliki, but nonetheless remain concerned about US sanctions. Several Iraqi officials and framework members criticized ”foreign interference” in Iraqi affairs following Trump’s statement about Maliki.[21] A senior framework political adviser also told an Iraqi journalist on February 16 that most of the framework has agreed to rescind Maliki’s nomination if he does not voluntarily withdraw in order to avoid US sanctions.[22] The adviser said that the US threatened to sanction “Iraq’s oil lifeline and financial core,” including the Oil Ministry and Iraqi Central Bank, on March 1 if the framework continues to support Maliki.[23] US opposition to Maliki is derived from authoritarian and sectarian policies that Maliki pursued after the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, which contributed to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Iraq.[24] The United States ultimately conditioned its support for Iraq against ISIS in 2014 on Maliki’s removal from power due to his direct role in destabilizing Iraq.[25]

Maliki’s continued insistence on the premiership will probably force the framework to revoke his nomination to end the ongoing deadlock, as CTP-ISW assessed on February 17.[26] Iraqi media reported on February 18 that Maliki cancelled two “crucial” framework meetings due to his fears of the framework voting to replace him.[27] Maliki’s intervention and attempts to delay his own ousting are likely tied to the deadlines that the United States has set and extended to pressure the framework to nominate a new prime minister.[28] A Kurdish journalist reported on February 16 that the United States gave the framework a February 16 deadline to nominate a new prime minister.[29] An unspecified political source told Iraqi media on February 18 that the new deadline is February 19, however.[30]  

Iran Update, February 18, 2026

Key Takeaways

Iran

Iran is continuing its efforts to fortify the Taleghan 2 facility at Parchin Military Complex, which is consistent with Iranian efforts since the Israel-Iran War to rebuild its nuclear program and harden nuclear facilities against future airstrikes. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on February 17 that Iran has covered the facility with soil, after the regime had already encased the facility with a concrete “sarcophagus” to protect against airstrikes.[31] Parchin is a defense industrial site that Iran has used to develop and manufacture explosive materials, rockets, and other munitions.[32] Iran used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before it suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[33] Israel struck Taleghan 2 and destroyed equipment that would be needed to design and test explosives used in nuclear devices in October 2024.[34] The Institute for Science and International Security has assessed in recent weeks that Iran is also hardening infrastructure at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and Kolang Gaz La Mountain nuclear facility in preparation for possible future strikes.[35] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may prolong the talks with the United States to provide itself additional time to reconstitute its nuclear and/or ballistic missile programs.[36]

Iraq

Nothing significant to report.

Syria

Nothing significant to report.

Arabian Peninsula

CTP-ISW suspended its coverage of Yemen beginning on January 9.

Palestinian Territories & Lebanon

Hezbollah appears to have deterred the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from confronting Hezbollah north of the Litani River in the second phase of its disarmament plan. The Lebanese government gave the LAF a four-month deadline on February 16 to implement the second phase of the LAF plan to disarm Hezbollah.[37] The second phase concerns disarmament operations between the Litani and Awali rivers.[38] Unspecified security sources told Saudi media on February 17 that the LAF will not confront “any Lebanese faction” in the next phase of its disarmament plan, almost certainly in reference to Hezbollah.[39] The sources did not specify whether they are referring to general confrontation or specifically military confrontation. An informed source told Lebanese media on February 16 that LAF Commander Rodolphe Haykal will ”adopt a gradual approach” toward disarming Hezbollah.[40] The sources’ comments to Saudi and Lebanese media suggest that the LAF is unwilling to adopt a confrontational or aggressive posture toward its efforts to disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River. Such a posture would presumably require the LAF to disarm Hezbollah fighters using force. The LAF may adopt the cautious and non-provocative approach that its forces implemented in the first phase of the LAF’s operations to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.[41] The LAF did not appear to seize arms from any active Hezbollah sites with Hezbollah personnel present in southern Lebanon during this phase of LAF operations, nor did the LAF militarily confront Hezbollah. The success of LAF efforts to disarm Hezbollah in the south was due mostly to Hezbollah’s acquiescence rather than forced disarmament.[42] The LAF was also hesitant to search private property during the first phase and only searched a limited number of private properties despite serious Israeli pressure on the LAF to do so.[43] Hezbollah has framed its disarmament in the north as an existential issue and has issued threats of political unrest, protests, and internal conflict to encourage the LAF to slow or cease its disarmament efforts.[44] These threats have likely affected Lebanese leaders‘ willingness to forcibly disarm Hezbollah north of the Litani River.[45]

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[1] https://www.axios.com/2026/02/18/iran-war-trump-military-strikes-nuclear-talks
[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-17-2026 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-5-2026
[3] https://www.axios.com/2026/02/18/iran-war-trump-military-strikes-nuclear-talks
[4] https://www.axios.com/2026/02/18/iran-war-trump-military-strikes-nuclear-talks
[5] https://www.axios.com/2026/02/18/iran-war-trump-military-strikes-nuclear-talks
[6] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/worlds-largest-aircraft-carrier-heads-middle-east-iran-nuclear-tensions-spike-dramatically
[7] https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2024144772957339900 ;
https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024134570895892685?s=20 ;
https://x.com/IranIntl/status/2024140182874948095 ;
https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024168474218528925?s=20 ;
https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2024205440695824670 ;
https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/2024207364979663208?s=20
[8] https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/2024136558664732929?s=20
[9] https://x.com/AmirMiresmaeili/status/2024128951610638744 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/2024147311891206297?s=20
[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-mourning-ceremonies-prompt-new-crackdowns-echo-1979-revolution-2026-02-18/
[11] https://www.radiozamaneh dot com/879238/
[12] https://www.en-hrana.org/day-50-of-the-protests-intensification-of-security-prosecutions-and-uncertainty-regarding-the-status-of-detainees/
[13] https://almadapaper dot net/427252/
[14] https://almadapaper dot net/427252/
[15] https://almadapaper dot net/427252/
[16] https://thestateofiraq.com/2026/01/28/sudanis-endgame-backed-by-trump/ ; https://en.964media dot com/44639/
[17] https://almadapaper dot net/427252/ ; https://alssaa dot com/post/show/41580-iraqi-parliamentary-elections-2025
[18] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/280620256 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-kataib-sayyid-al-shuhada ; https://964media dot com/650794/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-26-2026/ ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/890035/slug ; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115968824541011312
[20] https://almadapaper dot net/427252/
[21] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/فيحان-يحذر-من-رادات-خارجية-تهدد-السلم-العالمي-وي-كد-على-دبلوماسية-الهوية-الوطنية ; https://ina dot iq/ar/political/253839-.html
[22]
[23] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2023470599323218007
[24] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf ; https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-malikis-iraq/
[25] https://www.dohainstitute dot org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The_US_and_Iran_Concur_Maliki_Had_to_Go.aspx
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-17-2026/
[27] https://almadapaper dot net/427252/
[28] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2023469613527568609 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9
[29] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/2023469613527568609
[30] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9
[31] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery-update-taleghan-2-facility-is-now-being-buried
[32] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/israeli-retaliatory-strikes-on-iran ; https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/parchin-possible-nuclear-weapons-related-site-in-iran#:~:text=The%20Parchin%20military%20complex%2C%20located,nuclear%20weapons%20work%20is%20ambiguous.
[33] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery-update-concrete-sarcophagus-at-taleghan-2-nears-completion
[34] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility
[35] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery-update-all-entrances-to-esfahan-tunnel-complex-are-now-completely-buried; https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery-update-new-developments-at-pickaxe-mountain-tunnel-entrances
[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-11-2026
[37] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318437-govt-says-army-to-take-at-least-4-months-for-n-litani-disarmament
[38] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/318437-govt-says-army-to-take-at-least-4-months-for-n-litani-disarmament
[39] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5241885-الجيش-اللبناني-يعتمد-مقاربة-أمنية-سياسية-لتنفيذ-ثاني-مراحل-حصر
[40] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1495056/lebanon-ready-to-expand-role-within-mechanism-salam.html
[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-pushes-lebanon-army-search-more-intrusively-hezbollah-arms-sources-say-2025-11-10/
[42] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/weakening-hezbollah-requires-faster-international-support-to-lebanon/
[43] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-pushes-lebanon-army-search-more-intrusively-hezbollah-arms-sources-say-2025-11-10/ ; https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/2000158668914930063 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1999827456325222890
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/weakening-hezbollah-requires-faster-international-support-to-lebanon/
[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/weakening-hezbollah-requires-faster-international-support-to-lebanon/

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